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I. OPENING

We Homo sapiens sapiens are a proud species, and with great reason. It seems we
are blessed with a perfect anatomical combination of bipedalism, opposable thumbs, and
a highly developed brain. With this combination, we have become that which we are
today: the architects of advanced structures, physically and socially, capable of
modifying our world and ourselves to degrees almost unthinkable. We change the climate
and we can make the sterile give birth. We are capable of contemplating the bizarreness
and beauty of ourselves and our creations. The list of human achievement is endless.
Homo sapiens sapiens is a species which represents extremes in the animal kingdom,
extremes of cognition, adaptability, emotional capacity, etc., to a point that is so extreme
to make us feel wonderfully unique, to the point of being alone in our universe. We,
particularly in the western world, with our medical facilities and empathies for the ailing
or genetically unfortunate, have more or less removed ourselves from the Darwinian
game which gave us rise. While other animals are still bound by stupidity and ignorance
to the game of survival, humans simply watch it unfold. We like it this way, this easy,
almost assured existence. The term animal has become an insult within our culture, one
reserved for the lowest of society, those who act in an “uncivilized” manner. To think of
something which came out of the evolutionary race better equipped than ourselves is
unsettling.
In Daniel Quinn’s Ishmael, there is a hypothetical conversation with a jellyfish,
taking place a few hundred million years ago. The jellyfish tells the story of its existence
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on earth: “For many millions of centuries the life of this world was merely
microorganisms floating helplessly in a chemical broth. But little by little, more complex
forms appeared: single cell creatures, slimes, algae, polyps, and so on...but finally,
jellyfish appeared!” (55-56). This proud jellyfish very much represents human attitudes
today; here and now we are apex, we are the end result of hundreds of millions of years
of evolution, and it seems we are not what we were borne of, we are no longer mere
animals. We have distinguished ourselves from them in what is unsurprisingly referred to
as the human/animal distinction. Again, to think that we are not on top of our natural
world, that we may not represent the peak of life forms, in unsettling. When it is a
jellyfish fancying itself as the best thing to ever exist, it is a bit comical. However, when
people are faced with a superior survivor, a “perfect organism,” a more cunning being, it
is scary - particularly when its survival depends on the demise of humans. The 1979 film
Alien presented such a situation.
Genre-wise, Alien falls under the categories of science fiction and horror, though
perhaps the best way to describe it is as a claustrophobic, “nihilistic, Darwinian
nightmare” (DeMoss, 2003). Several decades after its debut, the film is considered a
classic, but a quick synopsis is still in order. The film opens with a hulking ship floating
through space - the Nostromo, with its working-class crew: Kane, Brett, Dallas, Parker,
Lambert, Ash, Ripley (our protagonist and human of interest) and Jones, the cat, bringing
mineral ore back to Earth. When the Nostromo picks up what seems to be an S.O.S.
signal from a nearby planet, the crew must investigate, albeit begrudgingly. Upon
investigation, it becomes clear the signal is a warning rather; before the crew leaves,
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Kane falls victim of an alien organism, hatched from a leathery egg, which sticks to his
face, incapacitating him while keeping him alive. Against protocol, Kane is brought onto
the ship. This facehugger proves impossible to remove; once it dies and falls off he seems
back to normal - until a rather famous meal scene in which an alien larva bursts forth
from his chest, the facehugger having implanted its embryo within him. From here
evolves a sinister game of cat-and-mouse, the larva growing into the xenomorph of H.R.
Giger’s design within mere hours, and the crew being picked off rapidly by the alien
which utilizes the ship’s ducting to its own advantage. It is a silent killer, it is efficient,
and nearly impossible to locate until it’s too late. During this a surprise - science officer
Ash is a robot, ensuring that the true task of the Nostromo is completed: the harnessing of
an alien life form to be studied back on Earth. The crew is entirely expendable. And so,
toward the film’s climax we are left with three beings: Ripley our Heroine, Jones the cat,
and the xenomorph. Through a little slyness and a lot of luck, Ripley saves herself and
Jones from the alien (until the sequel, but that’s a whole other story). End Synopsis;
important scenes and characters will be expanded upon throughout as needed.
Alien, while a work of fiction, provides an interesting perspective into the
human/animal distinction. Ripley is in a situation which shows that she indeed is just
another animal in the competition to survive. However, her humanity is defined by what
she is not; between the cold, menacing xenomorph and the ever-adorable Jones, her
uniqueness as an organism is very much apparent. The film reflects many of the fears and
assumptions which surround the human/animal distinction. The human/animal distinction
is artificial, and while in ancient times it was a reasonable thought, today, in spite of
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knowledge of our evolutionary past and our connections with animals still-extant, it
persists. Why? and why should it not? To a great degree, the question boils down to: what
does it mean if we, as humans, admit our lives have no more inherent worth than a cat,
than a jellyfish, than the animal trying to kill us?
While the classification of humans as animal is a scientifically-based fact, the
questions as posed are deeply wrapped in both passive and active philosophies, theology,
science and semantics - with a little pop-culture mixed in, for this piece. Yes, we humans
are animals. Yes, we have no inherent individual worth beyond that of a generic animal’s
despite our rather remarkable capacities for creation, destruction, and analysis. However,
all animals being equal, it is not our inherent worth (or lack thereof) that is important.
Worth exists on a spectrum on animal abilities, and perhaps most importantly, it is the
worth that we assign to a thing, that we are capable of assigning to things, that matters.
Remember: at the end of Alien, Ripley had not risked her life for her fellow crewmates,
her fellow humans, but a cat, just a cat. And perhaps, this risk taken, this obligation borne
of worth, was the most revealingly human part of the film.
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II. A GAME OF SEMANTICS, CATEGORIES, ASSUMPTIONS AND PRIDE

The human/animal distinction in everyday conversation is greatly a matter of
ease. We often refer to humans as an entire group, and non-human animals as an entire
group. “Non-human animals” is simply too many syllables. (Herein I will often use
“animals” when “non-human animals” is implied, the context should make it clear, and
“we” refers to humankind.) This makes sense and is not inherently bad. We do not
represent generic animals, but ones with rather amazing abilities, and as members of a
species it makes sense to refer to ourselves in a collective manner given the similar tasks,
pains, and pleasures we all face day-to-day. An instinct to categorize exists within
humans, and one of the first things we distinguish is ourselves from the rest of the world,
be it living or inanimate; further, humans perceive the distinction between living things to
be highly “natural” and objective (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). Yet, this casual, instinctive
distinction both reflects and perhaps even exacerbates the more deeply made distinction
between the two. In our culture, the word “animal” no longer represents humans in
general. Rather it has become a connotatively-loaded term, when applied to humans, as is
factually accurate.
“Animal” has become an insult. To call another human an animal is to accuse
them of being malicious, slovenly, or out of control - insults to any human who isn’t a
frat boy at least. Murderers, child rapists - they are called animals, or they are called un
human, implying the same. While human attitudes towards non-human animals can be
extremely positive (animals as friends, comfort, important parts of our world and a full
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life, especially for companion species) they can also be extremely negative; we associate
animals with the more undesirable aspects of human nature, the “creaturely” side of
humanity (Beatson, Loughnan & Halloran, 2009). We may love little Jones the cat, but
when accused of being an animal we think of the xenomorph. We are not used to being
called animals, though we are comfortable with other taxonomic labels. Eukaryote,
vertebrate, mammal - these terms are of little controversy, and little connotation, unlike
animal.
To make it entirely explicit, yes, humans are animals, and though as demonstrated
above the word animal is connotatively loaded, it’s simply a taxonomic fact, taxonomy
being the classification of organisms. I feel it proper to make a quick investigation of the
terms “animal” and “human” before continuing. Scientifically, an animal is defined as a
living organism belonging to Kingdom Animalia, which are set apart from other
organisms (plants, fungi, bacteria, archaea, etc.) by six characteristics: 1. Being
eukaryotic (that is, having a membrane-bound nucleus) and multicellular, 2. Being
heterotrophs (relying on other organisms for energy) with internal digestive tracts, 3.
Lacking rigid cell walls, 4. Being able to move voluntarily, during at least one part of the
life cycle, 5. Having embryos which pass through a blastula stage, in which the embryo is
a hollow multicellular sphere, and 6. Possessing sensory organs with which to sense and
react to stimuli (“Animal,” 2008). The scientific definition for human is short and sweet:
a bipedal primate belonging to the genus Homo, especially Homo sapiens (“Human,”
2010). For here I’ll note: taxonomy is a field in which there is, and will be, much debate,
from where things are classified to what a level of classification signifies, on levels from
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domain to species. However, I’ll be so bold as to say the standing of human as animal is
not likely to be a center of debate for biologists, though how far back in our evolutionary
history the “human” may be. (Currently, there are anatomically modern humans, i.e.
ourselves, and archaic humans, our recent ancestors, accepted among biological
anthropologists. I refer you to chapter 3.)
Again, colloquial origins and use of “animal” and “human” don’t quite fit and
refer to those things which the scientific definitions do. The Latin word animalis from
which animal is derived meant “having breath,” and in common use it is a much narrower
term; when someone says animal “animal” they are likely referring to a non-human
vertebrate (“animal”). In contrast to what an animal may be, from a sponge to a human,
it’s an inaccurate usage indeed. Homo sapiens (sapiens) is just one of many names we
have given ourselves as a species, and it is a Latin term meaning “wise” or “knowing
man.” Though we accept being placed taxonomically among the rest of the animal
kingdom, the names says all for where we truly see ourselves in terms of other life.
Addressing the film, the title creature of Alien has no official name (though in the
sequel a member of its species is referred to as a “xenomorph,” Greek for “strange
shape,” that name being used herein). This makes sense, as it has no official history; it
has no evolutionary history on earth, and thus technically, it cannot be an animal, though
for the purpose of this piece it fits the role. The xenomorph definitely seems to be an
extraterrestrial equivalent of an animal; it’s certainly multicellular, the plot of the movie
is largely based on its heterotrophic needs, it’s motile, is able to sense and react to
stimuli, and though we cannot know for certain the specifics of its embryonic

7

development and cellular structures, it is functionally an animal - for the sake of ease, I’ll
just say it is an animal, given the creators’ intentions for it to be just that. Jones is another
creature that sort of inhabits a grey area in the animal world. He is a cat, a domestic cat,
undoubtedly an animal but one which has been in part shaped by artificial selection, by
human hands. I feel a need to acknowledge the fact before delving in further, but from
feral colonies to adoptive nursing of close wild relatives, we may assume humans didn’t
mess up a cat’s ability to survive in a non-human controlled environment entirely. Ellen
Ripley and the Homo sapiens crew of the Nostromo don’t really fall into a grey area in
the world of animals, though they might fancy they do at the beginning of their tale,
before they are again thrust into the Darwinian game, and find themselves to be poorer
players than imagined.
Much of the debate around the human/animal distinction may be boiled down to
language and the way in which it is used and changed. Usage, over time, ultimately
determines what we find in the dictionary. The way in which language evolves and
meanings behind words, this is unfamiliar territory for me, and thus I fear I am unable to
give the semantics of the human/animal distinction its due analysis. However, I reject the
notion that the human/animal distinction is purely a linguistic issue. While my analysis
focuses on the western English-speaking world, the sentiment of the distinction certainly
exists in other cultures, who describe the distinction with other words, with other
meanings, which may or may not have direct translations to what we speak of here. (The
sentiment also may not exist strongly in some other cultures, one of the reasons I focus
on the westernized world. If the reader is wondering, the other main reason is, it is the
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world I live in, will live in, and am interested in as it affects me.) Also, there is a certain
permanence the distinction has shown, at least for the last several millennia - for example
the three texts of western religious importance, the Koran, Christian Bible, and Torah, are
all proponents of the human/animal distinction, being written and translated through
various times, languages, schools of thought, etc. While language changes, while the
scientific definition of “animal” may even change given new knowledge, the sense that
humans represent this otherness will likely remain. The human/animal distinction exists
beyond the words which illuminate it, and this existence has application well beyond
semantic games.
Through the instinctive, if not inaccurate categories of the human/animal
distinction, humans have created a sort of “us and them” between humans and the rest of
the animal kingdom. By doing so, humans perceive themselves to be removed from the
spectrum of traits found in the animal kingdom, and to make vast generalizations about
the two groups. Animals are part of nature, humans are above nature. Animals are subject
to natural selection, while humans represent the most evolved, able, and sophisticated of
Earth’s life. We won the evolutionary race. We eat and are not eaten, we make our weak
strong again, we manipulate evolution to our own end, creating super-crops and Shar
Peis. There is an underlying assumption here, to be further investigated at a later point,
that humans are uniformly superior, and that if another human is mentally and/or
physically inferior, he or she is still protected under some sort of human dignity, assigned
to any one member of the species simply because they are human. We refuse to let
human ability or worth be measured on a non-human animal scale, we refuse to let
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ourselves be compared to other animals; a mentally retarded adult is described as having
the intelligence of a toddler, not a chimpanzee. Once more, this is not bad. We
understand a toddler’s intelligence better than a chimpanzee’s, and there’s a matter of
sensitivity called for. Also, generalization are not inherently bad, as they are quite useful
- I’m making a huge generalization in the writing of this piece, that all Westerners see
themselves and other humans in the light presented. However, this does not make the
human/animal distinction less false, nor assumptions of human dignity above that of
other animals’. I would argue yes, we do represent the peak of life on earth at the
moment, but it let’s not be proud jellyfish about it.
Note - before leaving the subject of language and semantics, I should give
operational definitions to what is meant when “distinction,” “inherent,” “obligation,” and
“worth/value” are used herein. To say the human/animal distinction is false is not to say
humans are not distinct from other animals. As stated, we represent a very distinct sort of
extreme on the spectrum of animal ability. However, “animal” is a category that includes
humans; the human/animal distinction is that claim that we are somehow, at some level,
not animals or at least different from them as a whole, as opposed to the claim we are a
particular sort of animal. When using inherent, I mean “in and of itself,” usually in the
context of human worth and/or value. This is addressing the concept touched on in the
opening and above, that humans are granted a degree of worth or value based on what
they are, species-wise. For these purposes, worth and value mean something like dignity
- the right to a certain (high) quality of life, and certain treatment from others. This ties
into the term “obligation,” to be examined in later sections. Here, an obligation is the
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sense that dignity and caring should be extended to a certain being. While these
definitions are nothing new, I hope this provides some clarity.
Continuing - the Nostromo represents human achievement in Alien. While it’s
safe to assume it isn’t the most ornate vessel floating the galaxies in this futurescape, it’s
a space-faring craft, embodying human intelligence, ambition, understanding, and
curiosity. While other animals are subject to the resources of Earth, humans are now free
to roam the stars for mineral ore. To create such a craft requires advanced technology, as
well as advanced social skills, as its completion would require the cooperation of perhaps
hundreds, from engineers to manual laborers at some point in time. That same level of
technology and cooperation is needed to keep it functional, to repair it, and to make it
useful. Though the intended usage of the Nostromo is very blue-collar and practical, it
represents a certain drive that seems uniquely human. To make a cliche of it, we humans
reach for the stars, quite literally in this case. The use may be practical, but at a level the
Nostromo is borne of a collective desire for humans to increase their societies,
knowledge, creations. If the resources of the planet are no longer sufficient, we do not
cull human populations, acting practically as an animal would do. We do not stop
building. We instead expand our resources because we are the beings which are capable
of doing so. I make many assumptions about Earth in Alien, but they make sense giving
the circumstances presented. If the Nostromo’s stated purpose is practical, the “secret”
purpose is driven by curiosity. What else is out there? We’ll find out because we can.
With human achievement comes human pride.
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Another cliche states that pride comes before the fall, and in the case of the
Nostromo and its ill-fated crew, this is very much the case. In Alien and the world of
today, the more we increase our knowledge of the universe, the smaller the human role
seems in it. For some, this knowledge is fascinating, almost transcendent. For the crew, it
is a terrible realization. Where on Earth, at the given point in time, humankind represents
an extreme, an apex, in the larger scope of things we are still very much the hunted, the
insignificant. We are Darwinian players in a terrible game, where our curiosity and
intelligence plays a lesser role in survival ability. The corridors of the Nostromo become
the perfect hunting grounds for the xenomorph, the better competitor - it kills many
humans before it is killed. It uses the details of the ship, the ducts and the gaps, to an
advantage. Ash calls the xenomorph a “perfect organism.” It is not perfect, obviously, but
the greater point is, neither are we humans. Had she sat around on Earth like a good
animal, Ripley would not be so traumatized, so humbled.
There’s a good deal of sarcasm in that last statement, and I hope that’s obvious.
Of course humans should not hinder technological and intellectual development in the
name of preserving pride and avoiding alien attack, or hinder development in the name of
being more like the other animals. But our intellectual abilities plus our thumbs and
bipedalism have certainly gotten us in sticky situations which other animals do not
encounter, situations which may threaten our survival - if not by alien encounters, then
by ourselves. Perhaps if our proud jellyfish had a nervous system capable of forming an
agenda and some thumbs, it would have created nuclear weapons too. We Homo sapiens,
we wise men, are so smart we are capable of doing something very stupid in terms of our
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survival en masse. We Homo sapiens are proud of our compassions, our ethics based on
the inherent worth as humans, and thus we deny the natural logic of carrying capacity,
feeding starving human populations and treating density-depended diseases to the point
that we are simply building up the inevitable, making the struggle to survive that much
more dismal for future generations than if there had been no intervention.
Herein, I challenge these assumptions on which humankind often depends on the assumption that we humans are unique and apex, inherently of greater worth than
other species, etc. Do humans represent an apex being? I would say yes, for this place at
this time. But if we were to take a lesson from the Nostromo, we shouldn’t get too cocky
about it.
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III. ANIMAL EVOLUTION, HUMAN ABILITIES

To be an animal is to have a certain evolutionary history. If humans are animals,
that means human traits came about through the same general process which bore any
animal species, specifics differing of course. This is easily understood for overtly
anatomical and physiological traits, but the traits we consider most uniquely “human” - a
large intellectual, and even more so a large emotional capacity - seem almost separate.
The fact is, these traits , like bipedalism and opposable thumbs, are based in evolutionary
history. Thus, to understand why the human/animal distinction is artificial, the evolution
of the human animal, and its extreme traits, must also be understood. The mechanisms of
evolution are simple in their purest form; I’ll be brief with them, as for many readers this
is review. However, human evolution is the highly contextual action of these
mechanisms. To do it true justice would take a novel or more, and I will limit
developments and examples to those most illuminating to the topic.
To begin, a few time references. The Earth originated about 4.6 billion years ago.
The first organisms (unicellular bacteria) originated 3.8 billion years ago, and
multicellular organisms 2.1 billion years ago. Eukaryotes, the domain to which animals
belong, evolved approximately 1.5 billion years ago, and Homo sapiens sapiens
(anatomically modern humans) showed up only in the last 0.2 million years. That means
humans are, as of now, a blip on geological time, having only existed for 0.004% of time
since Earth’s beginning (“History of life,” 2012). However, human evolution begins all
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those billions of years ago, with the appearance of those first, primitive life forms, just
like all other organisms on Earth, past and present.
The beginnings of life came before 3.8 billion years ago; before cells could exist,
there had to be self replication monomers, then polymers. Abiogenesis - life from
inorganic sources, or the origin(s) of these molecule is still a debated topic, though
derivatives of the Oparin-Haldane theory are accepted at this time. This states that those
first monomers were formed from chemical interactions of the primordial atmosphere and
oceans, a theory made believable in 1828, when Wohler’s synthesis of urea showed that
organic compounds may be synthesized from inorganic substances. While the very
beginnings of life are still being investigated, evolutionary theory has changed
remarkably little since 1859, when Darwin’s On the Origin o f Species was published quite a feat in the scientific world. Granted, Darwin and his contemporaries did not have
the language of genetics, alleles, etc. to describe evolution on a molecular basis; the later
discovery of DNA as the basis of heredity strengthened evolutionary theory (Berlinski,
2006). This discussion will focus mainly on phenotypes, the physical manifestation of
genotype, for simplicity, keeping in mind that DNA/RNA is the substance which links all
living things to a common ancestor.
As described by Darwin in On the Origin o f Species (1859), evolution is driven
by reproductive success, and reproductive success is determined by fitness, the catalyst
for all being the “struggle for existence” - resources are scarce, and fitness is determined
by an organism’s ability to obtain and use resources in a given environment. The more fit
an organism, the more it is able to reproduce, and the more its heritable traits (“genes” or
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“alleles” in the modern vernacular) - especially those which make the organism
successful - are passed to later generations. This phenomenon is referred to as natural
selection, and is the first major concept in evolutionary theory. (Artificial selection occurs
when we humans decide what is most desirable in an organism, whether or not that trait
would be compatible with survival in a non-human controlled environment. These
desirable traits are selectively bred, in everything from orchids to pigeons to domestic
cats - this is why Jones represents a sort of gray area in the realm of evolution.) The
second is speciation, the formation of new species. Speciation occurs when populations
of a single species become isolated. This is often meant in a literal geographic sense;
however it occurs, the isolated groups of a species have different proportions of alleles.
As breeding continues within groups, some alleles become more prevalent than others in
the parent species. Genotypes, thus phenotypes change, and over time a new species
emerges. A quick note: not all traits have a functional origin; that is, some traits exist for
reasons other than direct contributions to the species’ fitness. Genetic drift events, where
simple chance plays a role in survival (ex. a hiker happens to trample much more pink
flowers than blue - blue flowers survive by chance) and linked genes (one gene tends to
be passed on with another consistently) are likely the origins of several traits in many
species. Also, again note that these concepts are simplified herein, but still it remains:
these are the basic processes of evolution, and in a way they are conceptually simple. It is
when the concepts are applied in highly contextual environments with particular species
that seemingly miraculous, or at least improbable things happen - like the emergence of
our “most human” traits.
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Figure 1

Above (Fig. 1) is a phylogenetic tree, showing the evolutionary relationships
between modern primates, from the primate ancestral species (Diogo & Wood, 2011).
Note that while evolution is a fact, specific taxonomies and phylogenies are still hotly
debated in the scientific world. Older phylogenies are based on morphology (i.e. visible
physical characteristics) alone, while nowadays descent and relation are largely based on
genetic information. Still, though some details of human evolution are being debated and
investigated (especially in regard to biogeography and the potential mixing of hominid
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species), the order of hominid descent as presented herein is generally agreed upon,
though many species are not mentioned or discussed. The relationship of Homo sapiens
to other hominids is summarized below (Fig. 2), with biogeography noted: Green denotes
the island Flores (east of Java), pink eastern Asia, pale blue western Asia, dark blue
Europe, and red denotes Africa (Finlayson, 2005).

Figure 2
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Roughly 4-7 million years ago (mya), likely in east Africa, the
human/chimpanzee lines diverged. The earliest known ancestor from this split is
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Ardipithicus ramidus, bipedal but still quite chimpanzee-like. By 4mya, bipedalism was
well-developed in species such as Australopithecus anamensis and A. afarensis. 2.5mya,
the tool-making Australopithecus garhi emerged; though this species is the first known
toolmaker, it is likely not a direct human ancestor. However, tool making became more
prevalent in following millennia, especially with the arrival of the genus Homo. Homo
erectus is considered the first hominid to travel out of Africa, expanding into Europe and
Asia. (H. erectus was a remarkably long-lived hominid, only having gone extinct
approximately 50,000 years ago.) 800,000-200,000 years ago, rapid brain expansion
occurred in hominids. At the end of this expansion the classic caveman, Homo
neanderthalensis, lived in Europe, and is considered to be the closest relative to
humankind, Homo sapiens. Homo sapiens also emerged from Africa into Asia and
Europe. This species is split into two groups: archaic and anatomically modern. We
represent the latter (H. sapiens sapiens), a species approximately 200,000 years old
(“Tracing fossil finds,” 2009) (“Dating”). With the extinction of the Neanderthals, we are
now the only extant hominids.
Though evolution is not inherently hierarchical, there is clearly a sort of
“forward” progression seen in the evolution of hominids, from Ardipithicus ramidus to
Homo sapiens sapiens. This may be attributed to the “Panda Principle” - the concept that
every extant character of an organism had an evolutionary precursor; current traits are
built off of previous traits, structures etc. (Gould, 1980). Because modern humans have
an evolutionary past, the traits and characters humans now exhibit existed previously, in
some form or another. Humans did not spontaneously develop massive brains with
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massive intellectual and emotional capacities. These capacities came about as most things
do, in the Struggle for Existence, and they emerged well before modern humankind did.
The expansion of the hominid brain was likely due to social, ecological and climatic
pressures faced by our ancestors, particularly between 800,000-200,00 years ago, though
expansion can be seen from 1.9 million to 10,000 years ago, starting with the species
Homo habilis (Bailey & Geary, 2009). With similar brains come similar capacities,
abilities, and behaviors. It would be foolish to think we are the first species with not only
remarkable intelligence, but language, culture, ritual, morality, and other “human” things.
These things are not beyond the scope of animal evolution.
Again, humans tend to view their less savory, “creaturely” sides as animalistic.
It’s not surprising, given the cold nature of Darwinian evolution. We can easily
understand how the Struggle leads to viciousness as a biological virtue, but those most
human traits, those which seem to defy natural law, really don’t defy it at all. It takes a
more nuanced and contextual view of evolution, but altruism, empathy, selflessness, are
too in the scope of evolution’s capacities - though it seems such characters might
eliminate oneself from the gene pool. It’s an odd thing to consider, but “humanity” isn’t
limited to humanity - though admittedly we Homo sapiens sapiens are the best at being
“human.” But I digress.
At the core of these “most human” traits is a large, magnificent brain. Brain size
was one of the large factors in distinguishing genus Australopithecus from genus Homo
(Anton & Snodgrass, 2012). Though to what degree anatomical changes fueled behavior,
and what degree behavior fueled anatomical change may be in the realm of debate still, a
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larger brain was clearly accompanied with more sophisticated behaviors. Before
anatomically modern humans, earlier hominids were building more complex societies.
Cooperation was used in hunting and foraging for greater efficiency, parenting practices
involved multiple adults, beyond the biological parents. While the exact species in which
these and other such traits arose is uncertain, it is certain that these traits, and practices,
and many more - from language and tools usage to reasoning and abstract thinking skills,
religion and even morality - existed well before the dawn of modern Homo sapiens
(Moritz, 2012).
The anthropological evidence for these things are well based, in the fossil record
and in the various fragments of everyday life which survived all these millennia. The
question is now: how could evolution select for such bizarre, wonderful things?
Cooperation and multi-parenting is easy enough to understand - ants and bees do that,
after all. We can easily see how an extreme intelligence would aid in survival - it’s
served us quite well, as we see today. What of the less creaturely traits? Altruism,
empathy, a sense of morality and obligation?
Darwin wrote, in his The Descent o f Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, “the
development of moral qualities is a more interesting and difficult problem. Their
foundation lies in social instincts.. .Animals endowed with social instincts take pleasure
in each other’s company, warn each other of danger, defend and aid each other in many
ways” (1871). This concept has been elaborated on and nuanced nowadays. Evolutionary
biologist Richard Dawkins also considers the evolutionary history and basis of morality
in humankind. He admits, “On the face of it, the Darwinian idea that evolution is driven
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by natural selection seems ill-suited to explain such goodness as we possess, or our
feelings of morality, decency, empathy and pity. Natural selection can easily explain
hunger, fear, and sexual lust, all of which straightforwardly to our survival or the
preservation of our genes. But what about the wrenching compassion we feel when we
see an orphaned child weeping, an old widow in despair from loneliness, or an animal
whimpering in pain?” (2006). Again, as Darwin said, the origins are based in a social
lifestyle.
Certainly, selfishness often contributes to self-preservation and thus the
preservation of one’s genes; however this is not always the case for social beings. To be
part of some society is to depend on one another - for food, protection, child-rearing, etc.
As stated, these traits can be found even in ants. However, more sophisticated creatures
take this social behavior to another level. Where an animal depends on other to survive,
for some of its genes to survive (this largely based on Dawkins’ “selfish gene” principle that for a gene to be successful, i.e. survive in the long run, it must code for traits,
behaviors etc. which help ensure its survival) they must code for social behaviors, even
altruistic or generous behavior.
The most obvious, and likely most common example of such un-selfish behavior
is kinship. An animal shares many of its genes with its close family members; when they
help each other survive, they are aiding in the survival of their own genes. (Note obviously, this is instinctively done; few animals act with a conscious awareness that they
are preserving their genes for a future generation.) This is the sort that can be seen all the
way down to insects, but also all the way up to humans. Another form is reciprocal
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altruism - a favor for a favor, mutually benefiting individuals, even entire species. This
can be expressed as symbiosis, for example between a bee and flower - the flower is
pollinated by the bee, the bee receives nectar from the flower. A simple intraspecies
example might be prairie dogs or meerkats taking turns with sentry duty. However, this is
also the basis for much of human behavior, especially in regard to trade and barter; a
hunter does not have the time to gather berries, and a gather hasn’t the skills to hunt.
They benefit each other by offering the goods and services which they are capable of
providing. And, if one takes too much without giving, their social status is harmed.
“Cheaters” are punished by social animals, through being ostracized, bad reputations, or
even violence (Dawkins, 2006). (A fact I find interesting enough to include - vampire
bats keep track of cheaters, who damage their social reputation by not repaying debts of
regurgitated blood.)
These altruistic forms are clearly not limited to humans, and they seem not to
quite answer the question of morality. Morality would seem to entail altruism where there
is no reward, individually or genetically. As Dawkins asked, “What about the wrenching
compassion we feel when we see.. .an animal whimpering in pain?” Our tale of Ripley
and Jones is a clear example. Ripley, by saving Jones, is endangering her life to save an
animal that is not close family, and does not closely share genes. She is endangering her
life for an animal which seems largely incapable of returning the favor. Where does that
most pure altruism come from, those good acts without an advantageous return, and why?
Here, we deal with empathy.
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The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines empathy as “the action of
understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the
feelings, thoughts, of a n o th e r.also: the capacity for this.” Understanding, awareness,
and a degree of sensitivity are required for a being to have the capacity for empathy.
While these will be somewhat elaborated on in the following section, there is an organic
basis for these traits, which come together to form that “most human” trait of all,
empathy. I hope I am not misunderstood; the previously-mentioned forms of altruism are
deeply interconnected with empathy. Empathy is an interaction of many things.
Neuroscientist Paul Maclean proposed that empathy is a result of brain function
integration; the interplay of primitive emotional circuits and higher frontal lobe activity,
or cognition. When a portion of the brain involved in empathy is damaged, the capacity
for empathy may not exist anymore, and brain imaging techniques show which structures
are involved with feelings of empathy - the superior frontal gyrus, orbitofrontal gyrus,
anterior middle temporal gyrus, and left middle temporal gyrus are a few (Harris, 2003).
Still, knowledge of how we empathize does not seem to satisfy the question of why, at
least not fully.
The “why” is another sort of integration. Going back to our example - why does
Ripley save Jonesy? The simple answer: because she wants to, and because she is
physically capable to do so. Because she has the capacity for empathy, the knowledge of
its potential fate, the emotional history with the cat. The why will be dissected in the
following sections.
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A few final notes for this chapter. Again, I stress, this little musing on evolution is
not even the tip of the iceberg, and there is still debate within the details of evolutionary
theory, especially in regard to human traits. However, the details are not of utmost
importance. The simple fact that these “most human” traits and attributions arose from
the same processes that bore all other animal traits is important in regards to the
human/animal distinction. Beyond the distinction being taxonomically incorrect,
evolutionary theory, and more importantly its hominid evidences, butts against the idea
that these traits are somehow beyond the scope of the animal kingdom, that they are
something special in that they are shaped by things beyond nature. Indeed, as seen, many
of these traits - physical, emotional, cognitive etc. are often found in other animal
species, well beyond the hominids, and will be elaborated on in the following chapter.
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IV. THE MECHANICAL ANIMAL

Ash: You still don't understand what you're dealing with, do you? Perfect organism. Its structural
perfection is matched only by its hostility.
Lambert: You admire it.
Ash: I admire its purity. A survivor... unclouded by conscience, remorse, or delusions of
morality.

The xenomorph (and many other aspects of the film) was based on the vision of
Hans Rudolf (H.R.) Giger, famous for his dark biomechanical artwork, especially as seen
in his collection Necronomicon. The exoskeleton looks as if it could be a highly
technological suit of armor, perfectly in synch with the organism. Pipe-like structures run
up and down the length of the alien, like some sort of hydraulic system. The mandibles
seem to be overlaid with polished chrome. The mechanical nature of the beast goes well
beyond the mere appearance thereof; Giger was blatant about his intentions for what the
alien was to be - “it exists to kill, and kills to exist” (Nurmi, 2011). The sentiment is
echoed by Ash in the film itself, shown in the conversation above. There is nothing
“deep” or complex about the alien and its motivations. It does not feel, it does not
question, it has no internal conflicts and few external threats. It feeds, grows, and reacts
to its environment only for the purpose of ensuring its own existence, its survival. It is
indeed a pure survivor, and a paradigm for the mechanical animal. To Ash, himself a
robot, it is “admirable.” Note - even Ash, a human robot which is entirely mechanical
has more ability to feel and think deeply, to admire at least, than the organic xenomorph.
26

Leave the world of Alien, travel back a few centuries, and we may examine
another proposed mechanical animal, the concept of a man very different from Giger,
Rene Descartes, “Father of Modern Philosophy.” Keeping in mind Descartes (1596-1650
) lacked knowledge of evolution, or even what we today would call basic anatomy and
physiology, his view which distinguished humans from animals still seems a bit, well,
vicious. Another philosopher, Nicolas Malebranche, summarized the most common
interpretation of Descartes’ views on non-human animals: “ They eat without pleasure,
cry without pain, grow without knowing i t . ”. Non-human animals are merely nonsentient automata, natural robots. Descartes’ reasoning behind this is two-fold. 1.
Animals are “unsouled” beings, which entails a lack of consciousness, and 2. We simply
cannot prove that animals are cognizant, thinking or feeling. The latter is simply the
result of skeptical doubt; indeed, we can extrapolate such doubt to say we cannot prove or
know anything (save that “we are,” according to Descartes) which while probably true is
no way to investigate anything, including the abilities of non-human animals. Thus, we
deal with the first aspect of reasoning, the “unsouled animal.” Now, Descartes didn’t
mean to say animals were absent of thought or organic sense, rather he meant what
animals feel and think are mechanistic responses to stimuli rather than conscious thought
or feeling (Thomas, 2006). When someone kicks a dog, it feels pain and yelps. Yes, the
dog feels the kick and yelps in response to it, and yes there is some sort of processing or
thought which allows the dog to react, but without an incorporeal soul there is nothing
beyond the simple audible response, again a “cry without pain,” as pain is a thing felt in
the soul. Where humans have both the sentient, feeling soul in accompaniment to a
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physical body, animals have only the physical body with which to experience the world thus Descartes reasoning behind the human/animal distinction is based upon dualism, the
mixing of the physical and the intangible.
The xenomorph is not the only non-human animal of importance in Alien. There
is also Jones the cat. Where the alien is a killing machine, Jones is something much
different. He is, obviously, a cat. He does not resemble anything mechanical, or act in a
way that is overtly robotic. Jones is cuddly, expressive, and perhaps of greater emotional
importance to Ripley than any of her fellow crewmembers. He meanders and does things
which don’t particularly aid in his quest to survive. To Descartes, however, Jones is as
much a mechanoid as the xenomorph, which is a much less acceptable thought - the cat
is so much more loveable! He may very well be the emotional heart of the movie’s
climax, and it is upsetting to think such importance would be ascribed to a machine.
The Cartesian view of animals is, unsurprisingly, not popular today, at least on the
conscious level. As the thought of Jones as a mechanical being is upsetting, so is the
thought of a mechanical Spot the family dog, a mechanical tiger in the wild, etc.
(Descartes’ role of soul and dualism in the persistence of the human animal distinction
will be expanded and investigated in chapter 5.) On levels more academic and scientific,
dualism has been replaced with materialism, the concept that the intangible, so long as it
does not present itself in an observable manner, does not exist; materialism accepts only
half of dualism, that which is “unsouled.” While the Cartesian view of animals is
formally rejected, it remains passively accepted to a great degree by the general public.
Again, the theological undercurrents which lead Descartes to his conclusions will be
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discussed at a later point, but for now suffice it to say that we still deny non-human
animals - especially those which are not charismatic - feelings and awareness; perhaps a
more accurate way to phrase that would be they are denied feelings and awareness of
importance. While the audience was tied up in the survival of Jones, hoping he would
make it out alive, he certainly would not have suffered like Kane, Brett, Dallas, Parker
and Lambert, right? At the end of the day, despite his cute feline visage, he’s just a cat.
There are two ways to go about refuting this acceptance, passive or active, of the
mechanical non-human animal: 1. Animals are not mechanoids, or 2. Humans are too
mechanoids. It should be understood that “mechanoid” does not refer to materials making
a being, ie. a robot made of synthetic materials, but refers to the motivations behind the
actions of a being. A mechanoid is controlled by stimuli either external, or internally
integrated into a being, that being unable to modify those actions it is programmed to
perform. This is what Descartes meant, to my understanding. Now, to analyze argument
1.
The animal kingdom abounds with examples supporting the statement “non
human animals are not mechanoids.” A wide range of emotion and advanced cognitive
abilities, including sentience, has been documented in many species. Given evolutionary
history, it shouldn’t be surprising that our mental and emotional capacities differ in
degree rather than kind relative to other animals. With great difficultly, I’ll attempt to
limit examples to a few poignant ones.
The American Heritage Dictionary defines sentience simply as “the quality or
state of being sentient; consciousness”. Perhaps a more precise definition should be used;
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as currently understood and defined, sentient beings are those which are “capable of
experiencing positive and negative affective states” (Duncan, 2006). Affect refers to the
experience of feeling or emotion, thus sentience herein is the capacity to experience
positive and negative feelings, to experience both pleasure and distress. Sentience goes
beyond the experience of physical pain and pleasure; again, Descartes did not deny non
human animals corporeal senses, but rather denied a conscious awareness, and emotional
accompaniment, to those pains and pleasures. For my purposes, I will stick with a quick
investigation of the negative feelings and pain. Indeed nociceptors, those nerves endings
which respond to pain, are found widely throughout the vertebrates and perhaps even in
some invertebrates, cephalopods for example. It’s no surprise, as pain is an important
survival mechanism, signaling bodily harm or damage and encouraging the animal to get
away from that which is causing damage. But when and in what does pain become an
emotional experience? Indeed, animals that feel pain beyond the mechanical are those
capable of feeling stress, terror, anxiety and distress (“Do invertebrates feel,”), all those
being dependent on a level of self-awareness.
To grossly simplify, for animals, the emotional response to pain is the result of
nociceptive input mingling with other brain structures not directly related to pain, or
relating to emotion. With this mingling, pain becomes an emotional experience, and
emotion can even alter pain perception (Brooks & Tracy, 2005); with regard to the crew
of the Nostromo, their terror likely made their deaths all the more painful, as negative
emotion exacerbates pain. Through empathizing, unconsciously or otherwise, they likely
felt, literally, pain when watching or thinking about Kane’s chest bursting open. The
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degree of this connectivity differs between species and the structures known to be
involved - for example, the habenula, a portion of the thalamus, is well-known as a point
of pain integration in some non-human species (Shelton, 2012). However, the same basic
idea accounts for the integration of pain perception with emotion animal species with the
anatomical capacity to do so.
However, though emotional responses to painful and pleasurable sensations
indicate sentience, it still seems perhaps that emotional couplings to such stimuli are
autonomic, programmed specifically. Thus, we look to more examples of non-mechanical
higher cognitive processes, and emotional coupled with not only sensation but situation.
The ability to communicate in meaningful, complex language had long been
considered a hallmark of being human. Our words carry not only mechanical definitions
but connotations, and can be produced and understood in sound, writing and sign. Irving
J. Lee, a pioneer in the field of semantics, once claimed “To be concerned with
language.. .is to bring us to the heart of things human...Language is the unique ingredient
in man, for where it does not exist, there abides little that is human” (Lee, 2005). This
statement rings with some truth; the requirements for true “language” include
grammatical conventions, which humans may have a sort of monopoly on (Cheung,
2006). Still, language is an advanced form of meaningful communication, and the
complexity of some species’ meaningful communication is underappreciated. It’s not
news that great apes can have vocabularies (in sign language) in the thousands, but the
fact is more remarkable when we consider some apes, like chimpanzees and bonobos, are
not merely associating a form with another form, an object with a word, but comprehend
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the meaning of the word when abstracted from an individual physical object (Haun &
Call, 2009). Indeed, Jane Goodall believes the only substantial difference between
humans and chimpanzees is the degree of complexity of communication used (2002).
Leaving the world of primates, consider the orca, pods of which have distinct dialects
depending on which area of the world the pod is native to. Orcas are even capable of
learning new dialects as adults, and their dialects change over the years in a process
similar to the evolution of human languages, i.e. mistakes in speaking accumulating over
the years (Filatova, Burdin & Hoyt, 2010), directly in conflict with the belief that human
are unique in their ability to pass on a system of communication as it stands in the
previous generation. Again, it’s difficult to limit the number of examples of meaningful
communication, but many simpler examples are also well-known, from the territorial
songs of birds to the dances of bees, but a final, more interesting one: domesticated cats,
Jonesies, have special sounds they use specifically for communication with humans,
called the “meow,” with specific tones and patterns of sound flux depending on what the
cat wants or needs at the moment, whether it be food, affection, or to be saved from
extraterrestrial menaces (Segelken, 2002). It should be no surprise, given the domestic
cat’s history of artificial selection, and this isn’t language in the true sense, but it’s a
fascinating phenomenon: we don’t just speak to non-human animals, they speak to us.
Another thing which we perceive separates humans from animals/machines is
personality. A machine is programmed to respond in a certain way to a certain situation,
and does not deviate from that reaction based on external factors or whims. Personality as
defined in psychology is “the organized pattern of behavioral characteristics of the
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individual,” i.e. the unique way each person goes about their daily situations. The word
literally means the quality or state of being a person, a term I’ve intentionally avoided (to
be later discussed), but for here, personality is the visible/behavioral manifestation of
individuals acting in a manner not entirely defined by their species. Individual machines
of a particular type would not act in such varying ways, unless defective, as there would
be a preset reaction to each sort of stimulus that could be experienced. Many species of
non-human animals would be defective machines given that thought; personality is “a
wide-spread phenomenon in the animal kingdom,” from insects to mammals (Wolf,
Sander van Doorn & Weissig, 2008). Individuals o f species, especially reptiles and fish,
can be placed in wide personality categories, for example attentive/inattentive,
nonreactive/reactive, nonaggressive/aggressive, but along the continuum we find more
adventurous personalities, those animals which are more likely to explore new territory
for resources, or for what seems pure curiosity. There are graded dominant and
submissive personalities, such as those found in social mammals (think wolves and
gorillas). Some mother animals have much stronger maternal instincts than others of their
species. Personality makes sense from an evolutionary standpoint; as personality traits
(such as willingness to cooperate) played a large part in the history of human evolution,
why should personality not exist in non-human species? When personality greatly
determines actions, and actions greatly determine reproductive success, personality
certainly can be seen in many species with the mental capacities to display it.
Alluded to above, a final aspect, and perhaps the most important of the few
presented in this argument, which exhibits the non-mechanical nature o f many non-
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human animal species is decision making, which takes into account some of the above,
especially personality, as well as analysis of a situation and emotion in the context of the
situation, as opposed to emotion as a reaction to a physical stimulus. Physical stimuli may
very well play a part in decision making, but to make a decision is to demonstrate greater
flexibility and depth of cognition than an autonomic response. Decision-making entails
choosing a behavioral response in a physical, social, and sometimes emotional context;
decision-making has been a phenomenon in the animal kingdom for hundreds of millions
of years, in some form or another (O ’Connell & Hofmann, 2012). The ability to make
decisions, even well-informed ones, does not nessicarily bode well for an individual;

Alien demonstrates many a situation in which humans make decisions which remove
themselves from the gene pool - beginning with the crew bringing aboard the infected
Kane. Even if it was the robot Ash opening the door, the rest of the crew knew better than
to bring him and the facehugger aboard, but the emotional considerations overrode the
practical, survival considerations. And they all died terrible deaths, save Ripley, the only
one who wanted Kane off board. Which isn’t to say Ripley made wise choices either;
though they were both fine in the end, the decision to go back for Jonesy was a bet
against her survival towards the film’s end - indeed, that moment of emotion driven
foolhardiness remains the bane of many a cineophile. Yet this all demonstrates that
decision-making, especially bad decisions, separates certain individuals of various
species from machines. Individual machines of a certain type/system/etc. (analogy:
species) are not capable of making decisions, are not capable of “being dumb,” are not
capable of overriding the response to a given situation or command. To new situations
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and external commands, a machine has a set response to that new thing, even if that
response is a lack of response. A machine does not fail to notice certain aspects of a
situation; all is taken into account. Many species o f non-human animals demonstrate the
ability to make bad choices, to fail to take into account all aspects of a situation, to now
and-then let emotions and attachments override an adaptive decision. Whether it is
realized or not, they can choose to remove themselves from a population.
I cannot stress enough the difficulty I find in narrowing my non-human animal
examples, and so I’ll pick one which has stuck with me for years to illustrate decision
making. I first saw it in a PBS documentary about Echo, an African elephant, and her
well-studied herd (“Echo: An Elephant,” 2010). Echo’s 34-year-old daughter, Erin, had
been mortally wounded and was dying o f blood poisoning during a migration. Erin had a
juvenile son. As Erin fell further and further behind the herd, Echo’s staying by her posed
more and more o f a threat to Erin’s son, the care of whom was taken over by Echo. Yet
Echo stayed with and circled Erin for days, comforting and checking on her. However it
came to the point where Erin could no longer move, failing but still clinging to life in an
area where there was not enough food to sustain Erin’s son. After much hesitation,
leaving for a short time and returning, Echo chose to move on with Erin’s son, and leave
Erin dying. Two weeks after she left, Echo returned to Erin’s place of death, finding the
bones of her daughter and going through a “grieving” process often seen in the elephant
world.
As Descartes asserted, there is no definite way to know the thoughts of an
elephant, but her behavior told the story of a difficult decision, a drawn-out decision. Had
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there not been a process of decision making, it would not have made sense for Echo to
circle her daughter, wasting precious time and energy, endangering Erin’s offspring
further. Even when it was obvious to the rest of the herd, and Echo herself, that Erin was
not going to survive the trip, Echo did not move along. She continued to hesitate, leave
and return, circle and stall. If a machine is an efficient decision maker, predetermined to
make and execute a choice as soon as the factors surrounding that choice had been made
apparent, Echo is a terrible machine.
Now, there is a problem with this argument, that non-human animals are not
machines. Firstly, those who subscribes to Occam’s razor would disapprove; even the
limited examples above have a sprawling quality, and examples are often speciesspecific. To illustrate that animals are not machines requires each animal species to be
examined given our definition of a machine; to reiterate, that is an entity which is
controlled by stimuli either external, or internally integrated into a being, that being
unable to modify those actions it is programmed to perform. This brings us to the second
and greater problem: many - if not a majority of - animal species to fit this definition of a
machine. The majority of fauna on the earth are not wolves, elephants, primates, or even
cephalopods; the majority of the examples in the argument above are, for lack of a better
term, “higher” animals. M ost animals lack the anatomical structures needed to integrate
physical stimulus and emotional experience. M ost lack the capacity to make decisions in
this deeply thought-out manner. It’s important to keep in mind, the word animal covers
not just mammals, birds, reptiles/amphibians and fish. Sponges, ribbon, flat and
segmented worms, urchins and starfish, nematodes, insects, jellyfish, they and many,
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many more are also animals. While there is certainly variation among these such animals,
generally they lack the nervous systems, thus behaviors, to qualify as non-mechanical
beings. Consider members of the sub-kingdom Radiata, best known as the jellyfish
group. Our proud jellyfish doesn’t really have the capacity to be proud - it has but a
simple nerve net, what is essentially a peripheral nervous system, able to sense external
stimuli and react, but with no higher processing. Like Descartes’ mechanical animal, the
jellyfish can feel but does not have feelings, can act but without a sense of intention, only
function. This same mechanical quality extends beyond jellies; members Bilateria, the
sub-kingdom of bilaterally symmetrical animals (encompassing the vast majority of
animal species) have brains, but many species’ are too simple to influence behaviors in a
manner which would qualify those behaviors as non-mechanical.
Clearly the “animals are not machines” angle is heavily flawed. It would have to
be conceded that only some, and few at that, species are non-mechanical. There is a
divide, not entirely based on taxonomy, in the animal kingdom between those species
which are and are not mechanical (note, this divide largely matches with the mentioned
colloquial usage of “animal,” which refers exclusively to mammals and other complex
vertebrates) and this first argument becomes a great mess, and in the end there is still two
groups: the mechanical and the non-mechanical, which isn’t to say that divide is entirely
false - it’s very real, and important to the sections on moral implications, to be discussed
- but it is still problematic in that human ability is still not looked at in the context of a
complete spectrum of animal ability. Thus, we examine argument number 2: humans, like
all animals, are also machines.
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This is no new idea. Descartes claimed humans were the only non-mechanical
beings on earth, but French physician and philosopher Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709
1751) believed that humans, presumably like all other animals, were mechanical. He
asserted there was nothing beyond the physical to which human behaviors may be
attributed, a bold assertion - especially in a pre-Darwinian era. According to Offray de La
Mettrie, a human being is an animal of such machinery which allows it to do and
experience these things with seem paradoxically non-mechanical. “To be a machine, to
feel, to think, to know how to distinguish good from bad, as well as blue from yellow, in
a word, to be born with an intelligence and a sure moral instinct, and to be but an animal,
are therefore characters which are no more contradictory than to be an ape or a parrot and
to be able to give oneself pleasure” (Whimster, 2006).
Offray de La Mettrie lacked, as we still do today, a perfect knowledge of this
machinery, especially neurological, which offers different animals different abilities, but
his arguments seems to allude to the spectrum of animal ability. There is nothing which
directly disagrees with evidences given in the first argument, but the essence of this
second argument is obviously different: the end result is not two groups of animals, the
mechanical and non-mechanical. Rather, all animals are mechanical, existing on a
spectrum of mechanical sophistication - if a jellyfish is an abacus, a mouse is a TI-82 and
a human being is a super computer. Animal ability and behavior is determined by animal
machinery, and not only the neurological system but a combination of that and other
bodily aspects, for example human abilities/behavior would be much different if we had
no opposable thumbs and walked on all fours, but had the same brain. While this

38

argument could be greatly expanded and reinforced with discussion of varying species,
with varying bodily systems and varying ability and behavior, it is at its core wonderfully
simple. Perhaps it’s stating the obvious, that what we as animals have determines what
we as animals do, but it puts humans, along with everything else, back on the spectrum.
We are not a distinct category, we are a member of a categories with distinct abilities, as
well has many overlapping abilities shared with other animals. Ash, a machine, had the
ability to admire the xenomorph because his mechanical systems were such that we was
able to feel admiration. We make decisions, create art, use metaphors, feel, and so on
because we have the machinery to do such. It is in our machinery, the brain structures
discussed, the bodily properties which allow us to exist as we do, which allows us to act
in ways we interpret to be uniquely human, non-mechanical. A simple machine, a
jellyfish, can only exhibit so many different problems; at some level, a simple machine
either works or doesn’t work. A more sophisticated machine is capable of being glitchy,
having different programs be more ingrained and advanced than others, those programs
differing machine to machine, translating perhaps into the quirks of human behavior, and
the quirky behavior of other sophisticated animals. Now, this said I feel I should address
part of the definition of a mechanoid used in the arguments - “a being, that being unable
to modify those actions it is programmed to perform.” I still feel this is applicable in light
of the claim that humans are machines, the actions we perform are ingrained into our
neural machinery, and dictated by our other aspects of anatomy and physiology - it just
needs to be taken into account that we have many, many actions “programmed” within
ourselves, we make a choice based on what is possible for us to do. I previously stated,
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while speaking on personality, that it would be a defective machine which shows
personality - perhaps this statement was inaccurate. Rather, it takes a more sophisticated
machine, with nuanced programming. While the mechanics of the animal world are still
being very much questioned and investigated, “we animals are all machines” seems a
much more elegant statement that “some animals are machines, but not humans.” The
mechanical animal may not be such a myth. Still, a bit more clarification is needed, on
what a (human) machine implied herein.
I want to be as explicit as possible, and that requires some reiteration. As stated,
animal behavior and ability is determined by organic animal “machinery,” but this does
not mean to be a machine is entirely deterministic; humans (and other intelligent animals)
are not devoid of freedom, as the word “machine” might imply. For an animal like a
human, freedom is built into the machinery. Think back on decision-making, an
obviously real phenomenon. Ripley, based on her anatomy and ability, had the option to
save Jones. She had the capacity to choose, and a capacity to act; these capacities are
based in anatomy, and the act of rescuing Jones is a manifestation of her particular
“machinery.” All the examples presented in the first argument, that animals are not
machines, are factual and valid - especially regarding decision-making. Again, semantics
and categorizations are playing a part, seen in the differentiation between the first and
second arguments, that all animals are not, or are machines. “Machine” in the first
argument refers to the sort of machine we are inclined to think of - cold and robotic in
nature, Descartes’ organic machine, lacking freedom of choice. “Machine” in the second
argument refers to an organism which has or lacks freedom as based on its machinery.

40

Perhaps it is not the second argument I have accepted, as both arguments make valid
points. It is the second definition o f machine I have accepted. With this second machine
accepted, but the facts of the first argument still relevant, a sort of paradox is made when
questions of value are brought up. Are all machines of equal worth, when worth beyond
the inherent is examined? No; with the second argument/definition, we have created a
unified category, but not unified worth among animals. This will be elaborated on in the
final chapter; I wish to not only acknowledge, but embrace this apparent paradox.
Also, to address some assumptions that might be made about the term “machine.”
I fully acknowledge that its use herein does not always parallel what is typically thought
of as a machine; the word is used in this chapter because partially for brevity’s sake
(“machine” is an easy word to which I may attach the concept of the organic animal
machine), though I do feel it fits given a few twists. The word “machine” implies a maker
and a purpose. Machines, in typical thought, are intentionally constructed for a practical
purpose determined by that maker. The organic animal is not this sort of a machine; there
is no maker and no inherent purpose (unless we consider evolutionary process the maker,
and passing on o f genes the purpose - though that still doesn’t quite fit).
Would Descartes be convinced given this argument, and accept these
definitions? No, as many others today and in the past would not be. For many, it’s not a
question of the material, but the spiritual - thus, I continue to examine claims of the soul,
and more importantly the idea that we are made in His image.
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V. IMAGO DEI & DUALISM V. DARWIN
Charles Darwin was highly aware of the philosophical and theological baggage
evolutionary theory carried, especially given his background as a student of theology.
Some of these stances are well-accepted today; he stood firmly against racism and
slavery, and believed his understanding of the natural world would aid against such
institutions - though unfortunately evolutionary theory was often construed to support
these things, but that is another story (Moritz, 2012). Other implications remain
controversial to this day, and these implications of human uniqueness are of concern
here.
It was only after much deliberation he released On the Origin o f Species, and
perhaps in the name of caution he ended the work with a nod to a higher being: “There is
grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into
a few forms or into o n e . ” . Note, he also was careful not to address abiogenesis, the
question of how that first ancestor(s) came to be, leaving that in the hands of a creator. In
the second addition, he actually added the phrase “originally breathed by the Creator”
(Porter & Graham, 1993). Unsurprisingly, this caution and pandering did little to quell
the storm; while he nodded to a god he didn’t soften his claims, claims which are
inherently packed with philosophical implications about our place in the world.
The concept of biological evolution was a perceived assault on all creation, most
importantly on the inherent dignity of the Creator’s children, humankind. Genesis opens
with the story of creation; verse by verse, God pieces together heaven and earth, darkness
and light, waters and dry land and fruiting plants, animals of all sorts. Earth, the universe,
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according to the Good Book, is not accident nor incident. It is tailored-made for mankind.
“And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and
over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth” (Genesis
1:26, King James Version). (Mankind was meant literally; women only came after this
declaration, but for simplicity’s sake and to reflect more recent times, humankind will be
the assumed meaning.) And there it is, the essence of the human/animal distinction. More
a manifestation thereof than a cause, but used as justification nevertheless.
In Darwin’s time, the accepted creation story told of massive, cataclysmic
creation, reflected in the popular theories of the time. Catastrophism was the name of the
game, the paradigm stating that the earth was formed and changed in a short period,
through massive cataclysmic events (i.e. “catastrophes”) which paralleled the stories of
creation, flooding and quakes as told in the Bible. While the term is most commonly used
in geology, the same sentiment was echoed in biology; through great godly events, each
individual species was created, with mankind as Earth’s highest creation. Geologists of
the era had been proposing the now-accepted paradigm of uniformitarianism, the concept
that the forces we observe today - erosion, slow-shifting tectonic plates, etc. had over
great spans of time shaped the world we now know. Darwin, inspired by these geologists,
had proposed another biological parallel. There was no grand creation, but rather species
had been changing for eons due to the pressures seen today, the competition for limited
resources in particular. Indeed, Darwin saw no particular reason humans should be
exempt from these pressures, these changes.
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By the time the major western religions were coming together, all other hominids
had been extinct for quite some time. Anatomically modern humans, Homo sapiens

sapiens, then and now, are the only remaining members of the genus Homo. Given a
limited understanding of the natural world, and the resulting perception of human
uniqueness, the creation story outlined above is as normal a reaction to the observable
world as the stories of Zeus throwing down thunderbolts and Poseidon churning the
waves. Nowadays, collective human knowledge of the animal kingdom is much more
extensive; the more non-human animals are studied, the more consensus in the scientific
world that human abilities are of a peculiar degree, but not kind, as postulated by Darwin.
Tool users, language users, and personalities abound in the animal kingdom. Regardless,
the concept of imago Dei remains alive and well; more modern interpretations of imago

Dei no longer claim that humans possess different kinds of abilities, this being the
“substantial” position (i.e. humans are of a different substance). They are more nuanced;

imago Dei is now an issue of relation between humankind and the divine. This relational
stance puts forth the idea that humans are not unique in terms of substance or ability, but
in their relations to the Creator (Miller, 2011). This is clearly more difficult to tackle;
while anthropological evidence would include earlier hominids in this category, I cannot
think of any other species currently on the planet which interact so greatly with concepts
of the supernatural and divine.
Even so, this may still exist as a question in the realm of degree, and not kind. The
relational approach implies that the relationship between god and man is the cause and

reason for such large intellectual capacities; humankind is generally rational so that it
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can, and because it does, make connections with the divine. As theologian Karl Barth
said, “ . m a n is the being that is for God. It is as such that he surpasses all other
creatures” (Miller, 2011). By definition, both the substantial and relational conceptions of

imago Dei function to preserve the otherness of human beings. Unless all animals are
created in His image, humans have a unique relation to God which other animals do not;
the Bible makes this case clearly. As long as humans are solely connected to God, by
relationship or substance, there is still a sense of distinction between humans and all other
creatures. The relational approach simply makes the issue more slippery, by making the
argument based on the intangible; how does one argue against what cannot be physically
observed?
The presence of religion in humankind, and the concept of imago Dei may also be
a question of degree of ability. Religion is a wide-spread human phenomenon, and in
most religions, creation stories are, o f course, common. However, not all religions
include the concept of imago Dei. Humankind being borne from the Earth itself or other
animals are themes in many culture and religion’s creation stories. We humans, more so
than any other animal, are curious. We tend to seek meaning beyond survival and
reproduction, and we do this because we are anatomically capable to do so, because we
can feel deep pain and happiness, because we can attempt to rationalize events - perhaps
the most peculiar thing to try and rationalize is not “why are we here,” but “why do we
ask, why are we here?” As stated, when the natural world seemed strange and
unknowable, religion was an entirely natural response. Dualism also made perfect sense.
Once upon a time, humans did not even know that the brain was the thinking organ, and
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it’s only in very recent history that the neural mechanisms of the brain are being
understood to some larger degree.
Dualism, a concept closely associated with Descartes, when applied to humans
asserts that there are two aspects to an individual which interact to create their whole
selves, one aspect being the physical (body) and the other being incorporeal (mind, or
soul). Things that could be experienced by humans, but not physically understood, fell
under the category of the incorporeal. Emotion, cognition, and thus sentience were not
considered to be based in physical anatomy or physiology. I speak in past-tense, but
dualism is still, passively or actively, widely accepted, especially in regards to brain and
mind (i.e. the brain is what keeps the body alive, the mind is the entity with which life is
experienced and analyzed.) Dualism is often tied deeply with religion, particularly
Christianity - while the mechanisms of the human brain where ascribed to the soul,
mechanisms of the inexplicable natural world were the results of gods’ wills, spiritual
entities mingling with or causing physical objects and phenomena. W ith Descartes,
Christianity limited dualism in the material world to humankind alone; he found no
justification in Christian thought that non-human animals should be dualistic in nature.
Only humankind was made in God’s image, and only humans had the god-like qualities
of sentience: emotion and higher cognition, the “feeling” soul (Thomas, 2006).
Modern scientific thought now embraces materialism. While dualism requires the
existence of an incorporeal entity, materialism is concerned only with what is physically
knowable. For example, consider brain and mind. For a dualist, as stated, the brain is the
physical element which works together with the incorporeal mind to create thoughts,
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emotions, etc. For a materialist, there is no mind, or at most, the “mind” is what the brain

does. Even if the way in which neural signals are translated to thoughts is not yet fully
understood, the materialist does not postulate a spiritual entity to fill in the gaps - as the
physical is more and more understood, the gaps to be filled shrink. Now, materialism
cannot, and does not attempt to disprove the existence of the incorporeal. However, as the
natural world is understood more each day, materialism takes over more gaps where
dualistic thought once reigned. It cannot be known that there is no God, but it can be
known that the earth isn’t 6,000 years old. (Again, this is assuming one believes things
can be known at all!) Plenty of theists still exist, but young-earth creationists and
catastrophists are becoming a thing of the past. This sort of advance in scientific
knowledge helped push the understanding of imago Dei from the substantial to the
relational.
Humankind has been described as “The Questioning Animal.” We examine
existence not only on a “how” level, but on a “why” level. This questioning/curiosity
bore much of religious though, such as the concepts of imago Dei and dualism, different
schools of philosophy and education, this thesis. Recall, for some time now, this has been
the case - in modern times, yes, humans are the questioning animal, but in millennia prior
we represented a questioning animal. We now know that non-human hominids also
questioned - not only did they use language, tools, and reason, they too formed religions,
and the anthropological evidence for this is “incontestable” (Moritz, 2012). The question

imago Dei addresses is the same question which inspires Alien : are we alone? which may
be reinterpreted on Earth as: are we unique? Are we different from those animals around
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us, and how so? Homo sapiens sapiens is irrefutably an animal of evolutionary origins,
and while it is today the only “questioning animal,” that has not been the case for long
(and, with a nod to evolution - and maybe even space exploration - may not be the case
in the distant future). Is human uniqueness still a question of dualism? Does uniqueness
come down to a notion of imago Dei, that humans alone are made in God’s image? Even
if other species have contemplated their perceptions of the divine?
A personal note: if my time in a Catholic institution has taught me anything, it’s
that the attempt to dissuade (most) people from religious tenets, from dualism towards
materialism, is an entirely futile effort. The difficulty faced is the impossibility to
disprove a God, to disprove imago Dei, to disprove a sense of human uniqueness.
Frankly, I have little interest in that effort nowadays; militant atheism is exhausting. The
nature of these things is that they cannot be disproven. On that note, this paper and I
could very well be entirely wrong. There may be a very methodical and conscious God
which breathed into anatomically-modern humans, and anatomically modern humans
alone, a bit of its divine self. But where there is strong physical evidence, I accept it, and
where there is not an explanation, I do not create a God of the Gaps - or at least, I try not
to.
Just as science cannot coexist with young Earth creationism, imago Dei cannot
coexist with a lack of human uniqueness. On a whole, we humans have accepted
Darwin’s evolution, but not its philosophical and theological tailings. I write this as an
address of the issue, not a persuasive piece; like I said, I know now the futility o f refuting
such a thing as imago Dei. But as Madonna sang - though with very different context and
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meaning - I am a material girl, and this is a material world. We discover that more and
more every day. While I am obviously enamored with my own human self, my human
companions and humanity on the whole, I must accept not only evolution, but its
implications. I am not unique in the universe, not even on this planet, though in modern
times it is very easy to feel that way.
The question now is not are humans unique? but what does it mean if humans are
not unique? By holding onto uniqueness, especially when it is of divine origins, life is
somewhat simplified. Moral obligations are more limited to moral beings, i.e. humans are
obligated to humans alone. Other animals, because they are not human, do not require
moral consideration. How do obligations change when uniqueness no longer exists? Is a
cat worthy of human-like consideration? What of the rescue of Jones?
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VI. THE RESCUE OF JONES: IMPLICATIONS OF MORALITY & WORTH

Throughout the human/animal distinction, there is an attempt to conserve
personhood as a uniquely human phenomenon. I’ve intentionally avoided using the word
“people” and “person” instead of human(s), though the terms are colloquially
interchangeable. By some definitions, this usage is accurate, but the original
philosophical definition of a person is simply “a self-conscious or rational being,”
(“person”) and it is this definition which sparks debate. Person is much more
connotatively charged than the label “human” or the downright clinical Homo sapiens.
We casually assert that people are humans which act in particularly human-ish ways; a
person embraces life, is curious, altruistic to their fellow man, or at least a person is a
human who is not totally terrible. It’s similar and parallel to the connotations we put on
“living,” so that to live is to embrace life, explore, not simply exist. To be a person is a
sort of privilege. (To summarize: living is to existing as person is to human.) Those who
act in a radically socially unacceptable manner, the murders and rapists and child
pornographers, are not people , and recall in the section on semantics that these are those
who we accuse of being animals. These are the connotations which make the phrase
“Animals are People Too” somewhat comical, but eliminate those connotations and there
is some truth to this.
By maintaining the human/animal distinction and uniquely human personhood,
life is much easier for us humans. To be a person is not a simple biological label, like

Homo sapiens or even human. To be a person is to have certain rights, not strictly based
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in our biology or abilities, through which laws have been based, from those in religious
books to those in the law books currently. Life, property, privacy, autonomy - these are
currently protected, for humans, to one level or another. To be a person is have worth,
and to have some degree of dignity; when someone is aware of their own life and has the
ability to feel certain ways about certain things, they are granted a degree o f control over
that life, and when “human” and “person” mean the same thing we see it fit all humans
receive these dignities - to control their own life, to not suffer needlessly, etc. (Granted,
this was not always the case, slavery being a clear and recent example.) Even those
humans we call animals are entitled to a certain quality of life when imprisoned, and a
certain quality of death if needed. They are still human, and though we insult them with
the label “animal,” though we despise them, at level it is acknowledged that they are
indeed people. All humans are people and all people are not animals. With this
assumption we uphold that human dignity, that personhood which maintains the
human/animal distinction, and gives a motive to keep that distinction intact. When
animals are not people we don’t have to worry about destroying wildlife habitat, there are
few glares when taking Fido for a walk on hot asphalt, we can hunt and farm and eat
animal whilst protecting ourselves from our homes being destroyed, child abuse and
cannibalism. There is little guilt when we dictate how a captive animal is to live its life,
or when we chose the life of a car’s passengers over the life of a deer in the road by
hitting it instead of swerving. Animal life is not granted the presumed inherent dignity of
human life, of people.
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Personhood is not a biological label but a moral status in its common use. If we
were to consider the definition of “person” as presented, this would change. “A self
conscious or rational being” would encompass much more than humans, certainly not a
majority of the animal kingdom, but many animals with which we interact with. If Jones
was not a member of the Nostromo crew by his own free will, is he a slave? A being able
to make decisions himself but forced into dangerous places and positions by the will of
humans? If cats can be rational beings, people, why are critics so irritated that Ripley
risked her life to save Jones but would not risk her life by letting Kane in for medical
treatment?
Let’s assume the xenomorph is rational, making a conscious decision to kill the
crew so that it might live - why is the life of a human worth more than the life of an
alien? Ash, a robot, is certainly self-aware and rational - should his desires be secondary
to that of an organic person? (The whole issue of artificial intelligence and machine’s
rights could easily spawn a thesis of its own; if Ridley Scott’s Alien is a way to examine
the human/animal distinction, his Bladerunner, based on Phillip K. Dick’s Do Androids

Dream o f Electric Sheep? is worth a watch for the human/machine distinction that we
may well face and write of in the future. Interestingly it comes to a similar conclusion in
that the distinction is much more blurred than imagined, if not entirely artificial, but again
this is a whole other paper.)
Biological ethics philosopher Peter Singer has asked these questions of
personhood and has accepted and stressed the philosophical definition and its
controversial followings. When we look at all creatures which can be rational, sentient
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persons, that moral status we assign human persons must be extended to animal persons.
Furthermore, not all humans are persons. While we humans represent an extreme of
intelligence and certain abilities on a generalized animal spectrum, not all humans are of
equal ability; there are individual humans which have cognitive abilities far below the
generalized ability o f other non-human species. Some humans are not rational or even
self aware. Singer is blatant about it to the offense of many: the severely mentally
retarded are not people. Infants are not people. Humans are not granted personhood
simply because of their species, and members of other species may be granted
personhood if they fit the criteria to be a person. The granting of the moral status of
person to all humans while excluding rational, sentient non-human animals is termed

speciesism by Singer (2009), a term which nearly embodies the human/animal distinction
and the attitudes behind it. Singer stresses the spectrum of animal ability when it comes
to issues of autonomy and worth, “ . w e should drop the belief in equal value of human
life, replacing it with a graduated view that applies to [non-human] animals as well as
humans,” “it is clearly not the case that all humans have cognitive ability beyond all non
human animals,” citing gorillas with IQs well above 25 (that being the IQ below which a
human is severely mentally retarded), speech in animals, the ability for other species to
acquire knowledge and new skills to perform useful work, and the fact that non-human
animals tend to get along fine without human domination or interference - animals have
existed well before humans, and even domesticated animals are able to adapt to life
without humans.
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Dubbed the father of the animal rights/liberation movement, Singer seeks to
expand the tenets of utilitarianism, “the greatest good for the greatest number,” to non
human animal species. To ignore the suffering of animals which are people is a travesty,
especially since people are the source of much animal suffering, from habitat loss to
Tyson meat farms. If the critics are right, if Joneses’ suffering is less important than
Ripley’s, it has nothing to do with the fact that Ripley is a human and Jones is a cat. It has
to do with the cognitive abilities of the two; Ripley has a greater sense of her past, has
assigned importance to surviving which is deeper, based on more things, than Jones is
capable of comprehending. Ripley’s sense of her future is more understood, as an
intelligent human she plans in years, not days, hours or minutes. She remembers Earth
not just as a location but as an emotional point, a place where she was formed, a place she
left and is determined to return to. While Jones would likely have been content roaming
the seemingly endless corridors of the Nostromo until his fiery and/or xenomorphinduced death thereon, Ripley would not. Now, had for some odd reason Ripley been a
severely retarded human, the life of Jones would likely have taken precedence over her
own. The greatest good for the greatest number cannot occur if the animal capable of
experiencing good is dead, while another which does not comprehend experience lives in
lieu.
W ith many, Peter Singer is an unfavorable fellow. His multi-species utilitarianism
is asserted not just in the hypothetical world of Alien but, obviously, in real-life
situations, where emotion and law often reign. Some of his least popular stances are in
his justifications of abortion (at any stage of development) and infanticide - fetuses and
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newborns do not fit the criteria for personhood, and thus whether they are to live or die is
a question of what will bring the most good to those people whose lives are entangled
with the baby. Also, in what can be described only as hilarious, he justifies non-harmful
sex between humans and some animals. (His approach is not entirely rights based, but
based on his utilitarian principles. Do non-human animals have the right to not be
desecrated by horny farm boys? Nah, not inherently anyways. Depends on if it makes a
net gain in goodness.)
Singer refutes the central notion on which much of the human/animal distinction
is based: the inherent worth of the Homo sapiens. While personally I take no offense to
the claim that humans are not inherently more important than other species, I still feel a
sort of negative, automatic gut reaction to many of his arguments. I admit that when
looked at through a lens of pure rational utilitarianism, or even just pure rationality, his
less popular stances - take infanticide, if done humanely - make sense. As a non
believer, as I said, I have no problem with the concept that human life is not inherently
more or less important than other animal life. That life should be prioritized by knowable
worth, rather than perceived inherent worth, makes sense. Even on a societal level, we
accept and institute varying degrees o f personhood to humans; really, those under 18
years of age, or rather 21, are not allowed full autonomy, based on generalized abilities of
youths. Yet no matter how much I consciously accept the arguments, that gut reaction
remains. Part is simply what is felt when a social norm is challenged, having grown up in
an environment when infanticide and interspecies sex is generally frowned upon. Still
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another part of this reaction lays in an unanswered question: why are we humans
obligated to extend utilitarianism to other species?
Humans are part of nature. Not observers of nature, not destroyers o f nature, but
part of nature. We have been and we still are; it’s a fact given the artificiality of the
human/animal distinction. If the human/animal distinction was accurate, however, to be
obligated to other species, to respect the rights of personhood in those being which are
persons, would actually make more sense. The “stewards of nature” mindset would be
much more applicable if we humans existed on a realm above other species, looking
down, taking pity on those animals which were rational, self-aware, but ultimately unable
to stack up to the mighty human being. However, we are not inherent stewards, and
nature is indifferent to all perceived virtues and values - one could almost call it

nihilistic. Were we to assign nature a single virtue anyways, it would favor survival
ability. Nature knows no obligations, no stewardships, no moralities. Even survival
cannot be labeled “good” in nature, survival simply is. In an odd sort of way, it seems
like Singer and likeminded folk are exacerbating the human/animal distinction, or rather
the human/nature distinction. Where other animals need only survive, humankind is
obligated to let them survive? Where nature functions to favor the well-fit, we are
obligated to lessen our fitness for the sake of other species? Because we are currently
dominant in the animal kingdom, we are obligated to try to be less dominant? Nature
does not obligate us to restrain ourselves; again, there are no obligations in nature, no
utilitarian dreams, no goodness.
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That stated, I realize the ultimate hollowness of the “nihilistic nature” argument. It
may be correct, but because we are naturally able to examine ethics, to empathize, to
alter this world and perhaps others (As of writing this, Curiosity just touched down!) on
scales previously unseen, the argument that we have no obligations seems unsatisfactory.
To be explicit, if humans are borne of nature, in a sense all that we do is natural, simply
because we can do it. I agree with Singer to an extent; if he’s an animal liberation type,
I’m an animal welfare type. For example, the human animal needs animal products to be
healthy, such as vitamin B12, but because we empathize and can see beyond immediate
actions, we need not have cruel slaughterhouses and non-specific fisheries. Part of human
health is a healthy conscious. As an extreme on the spectrum, we are plagued with this
issue. Saving Jonesy, whether a smart move or not, was not a strange move. But Ripley
was certainly not obligated in any way to allow the xenomorph to live while she dies.
Likewise, the xenomorph, if it was a hypothetically rational being, a person, would not be
obligated to allow Ripley’s survival assuming it allowed for its own existence to
continue. At the end of the day, nature’s sole “virtue,” survival, remains almighty.
The obligations humans create are very much tied into personhood, into self
awareness, oftentimes rationality. Using m yself as an example, my obligations to other
species are based in Richard Ryder’s idea of “painism,” that is the idea that an organism
capable of pain - not the fruit fly sort of pain, but the fuller sense of pain discussed in
chapter four - has the right not to feel undue pain (2005). My sense of obligation to my
fellow humans is more based in karma and “the golden rule.” Regardless o f the cosmic
uselessness of these obligations, they make sense given the facts of this existence, they
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provide me a sense of worth in the vast universal worthlessness. And really, there is no
God’s eye point of view. There is no entirely unbiased, uninterested perspective. There
are only those people which are sentient, which are capable of experiencing, well,
experiences. There are only individuals, and individual perspectives. When Ripley was
risking her life to save Jones, there was no one looking down, tsk-tsking at the hilarious,
tragic, pointlessness of her fight. There was only Ripley, and Jonesy, and an alien.
Because the only experience is the passioned experience of people, this existence is not a
nihilistic one - it is, rather, existentialist. Because we humans, reading this piece, are
people, the worth we assign to ourselves and our fellow animals is worth as much as
anything.
For several dozen pages, I’ve stressed the artificiality of the human/animal
distinction. While people are stubborn, and my own argument of “no all-encompassing
viewpoints” may backfire on me in this regard, I hope I’ve made this artificiality an
understood fact. I’ve also stressed the implication: human life is inherently worth no
more than any other animals’. But perhaps the most important discussion to emerge from
all this is that of personhood, of machines with non-mechanical qualities. Ripley’s
decision to save Jones was rash, dangerous, stupid, heroic, and not the result of pondering
the human/animal distinction, not the result of coming to some Singer-esque conclusion,
but the result of being capable of experiencing and understanding loss, terror, pain physical and emotional. When the Nostromo was doomed and all human companions
dead, Ripley, as a person, had the capacity to assign and acknowledge worth. Perhaps she
too subscribed to an unnamed painism, perhaps it was entirely selfish - if she lost Jonesy,
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she had lost her last reason to live on - whatever the reason, she went back. (Thought: In
the chapter three, I mentioned that Jones probably hadn’t the capacity to return the lifesaving favor. Maybe in a way he did, by giving her a motivation beyond herself to make
it out alive. As our briefly-mention neuroscientist Paul MacLean once asked, “Why else
are we here, if not to help one another?”) Ripley did not base her worth on human vs.
non-human; where she risked everything for a cat, she would have had Kane die.
Just because this decision was rash and not thought out does not mean it was
entirely without base. Just because worth is assigned doesn’t mean all assignments of
worth are equally sensible or defendable. Consider a situation with not Jones the Cat, but
Jones the Lobster. If lobster Jones w asn’t to die in a fiery explosion on the Nostromo, he
was to die in the boiling waters of a hot pot. Lobster Jones doesn’t really have a brain,
cannot feel pain, and likely the last interaction had between Jones and Ripley would have
been a hard pinch on the hand. While audiences - if not pretentious critics - were
overjoyed at the rescue o f Jones the Cat, the reaction to saving Jones the Lobster would
have been somewhat less enthusiastic. It would be as hollow to say all assignments of
worth are equal as it would be to say there is no worth or obligation in this existence.
Personhood is not just the ability to assign worth and thereon make decisions, it is the
ability to be rational about that worth, those decisions, to understand the history behind
and future based on a decision, to some degree. Had Ripley decided herself to let in
Kane, it would have made sense. She had a history with Kane, as a co-worker and
companion, and his continued existence as such would have been welcome. As stated
previously, saving Jones the cat is acceptable, as he had long been a source of comfort,
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and when all else went to hell he was all she had left. Both Jones and Kane were capable
of feeling pain, suffering, and while utilitarian protocol would have doomed Kane (he
was doomed anyways), the decision to do anything but leave behind Jones the Lobster
would have been comical.
As promised in chapter four, here I will address blatantly the apparent paradox of
the argument. Starting with the human/animal distinction, we begin with the concept that
humans are inherently of greater worth than any of their fellow animals. By challenging
the assumptions and assertions of the human/animal distinction, animal worth is made
uniform among species. Yet here I make a new claim of worth, and thus a new
distinction. Worth has been deconstructed and built up again, but there is not really a
paradox; the human/animal distinction provides a system of assigning worth among
animals which is overly-simplistic, exalting one species above all others. The difference
between the human/animal distinction and my new claim of worth can be paralleled to
the difference between the first and second mechanical animal arguments: More than
anything, there is a difference in thinking. Even without a clear-cut human/animal
distinction, there is a spectrum of generalized animal ability, and at the most complex end
of that spectrum there are Homo sapiens sapiens.
As a human myself, I am intelligent, empathetic, with a penchant to categorize
and assess. This being a fact, again, the “nihilistic nature” argument feels empty,
uninformative, useless because I see worth in certain creatures around me. I see not only
worth in terms of environmental significance, or economics, but the sort of worth that can
only been seen with empathetic eyes, an understanding of positive and negative affective
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states - contentment, happiness, anxiety, pain. Because I do inhabit that extreme end of
the animal spectrum, I can both logically deny inherent worth in species, human or
otherwise. I can also see worth, undeniably, in individual animals with which I interact,
or simply observe. My individual human perspective cannot allow me to rest easy with a
simple deconstruction of the human/animal distinction. I can, and do, assign worth by
knowing that a lobster does not hurt nor bond like a cat does, by understanding how a cat
hurts, by having an emotional connection to a cat through little commonalities and
histories that I couldn’t share with a lobster. Consciously or intuitively, I assess the
degree to which I am obligated to an animal in a given situation; I might leave an
earthworm writhing on the sidewalk after a rainstorm, but I could not do the same in
good conscience were it an injured cat instead. From a human perspective - the only
perspective we can know - there is varying value among animals, and with value there is
moral obligation to them, to alleviate their suffering, slaughter them humanely, to treat
them with kindness, to consider their potential pain. Where there is human-like capacity
for suffering, or happiness, there is an obligation, borne o f that “most human” ability to

empathize, to treat an animal like we would a human.
To elaborate: With our human perspectives, the worth we assign to animal life
should be shaped by all those extreme, seemingly miraculous traits which make us such
fascinating specimens on the animal spectrum. Because we are sentient, capable of
experiencing those positive and negative affective states, why shouldn’t those creatures
which bring us joy be worthwhile? The universe is disinterested in the survival of Ripley
and Jones as much as it is the survival of the xenomorph - but those biased human
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perspectives, the only ones we can ever know, the only ones we can ever understand, let
us sigh relief when the cat is saved, when the human is finally home-free, and when the
alien is dead.
In the Nostromo, in a house of horrors on the brink of a fiery death while floating
through lonely space, Jones is not just a cat. Jones is both a foil and a reflection of
Ripley. Jones is a clever enough little mammal - he succeeded to survive a monstrosity
which took out many a human - but he cannot quite understand the implications of “the
self-destruct mechanism has been set, and I am floating through space millions of miles
from my ancestral home.” As an sentient, empathetic, cat-lady/strong-independentwoman-personality type organism, Ripley is perhaps obligated to help Jones avoid the
negative consequences of his ignorance. Because Ripley has exercised her capacity to
decide where and how Jonesy lives, she is perhaps even more so obligated to him. Yet
this obligation would not exist if Jonesy were a banana slug, a fruit fly, or a lobster. Jones
is capable of feeling emotional pain, of feeling contentment, of being curious (nearly to
his demise, the cliche lives on!). Jones has in turn brought Ripley comfort, and perhaps in
what could well have been her last moments, a sense of purpose. Ripley may represent an
extreme on the spectrum of animal ability, and Jones may not be so extreme. But it is
Ripley’s status as an evolutionary extremity which allows her to see and act on
(consciously or subconsciously) the bits of personhood, of worth, in Jones. They are
machines running different programs, but the programs are still compatible enough.
At this point, it’s important to also recognize more explicitly the role of
experience, not only ability, in assignments of worth. Experience shapes those biased
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human perspectives as much as ability - though it is through those certain
cognitive/perceptive abilities that experience is interpreted, mind you. Take an example,
closer to home but with some similarities to the rescue of Jones: the story of Duchess the
cat.
Duchess’ human family, a mother with two small boys, lost everything in a house
fire, including their dog. Duchess was rescued from the fire, but in poor shape; her body
was covered with second and third degree burns. Having lost everything, but needing
something for herself and her children to cling to in a tumultuous time, the family
matriarch decided against having Duchess put down. This decision would be a costly one
- from initial veterinary care to future surgeries and medications which would certainly
be needed, the cost of keeping Duchess alive, pain-free and in good health would reach
thousands of dollars easily. Thus, the family reached out through social media (the
medium through which I learned Duchess’ story) for the badly needed funds. My heart
ached seeing the photos of the little cat, looking much like any third-degree burn victim one can imagine, it’s not a pretty sight. Money poured in for the cat, but not without
criticism. Some felt the need to leave comments, in the spirit of “why not send the money
to a human in medical crisis?” or “why not put the thing down, it’s just a cat.”
To the family, to Ripley, it was not just a cat. When faced with horrors and
flames, it was not just a cat; nor were Duchess and Jones mere objects of comfort, simply
acting to fulfill some psychological need for attachment, like a doll. These animals are,
on the entire animal spectrum, complex little beings, not nearly to the point of a human
but close enough that they acted to reflect and bring out those “most human traits” -

63

empathy, caring, even the making o f decisions perhaps against what is rational, to outside
observers at least.
W hat Alien provides is a highly contextual example of the assignment of worth
among animals. Ridley Scott and the film’s writers intended this to be so. We know just
the bare bones of the crew and Ripley’s narratives. They are humans, they are on the job,
they are not fond of that job, or of each other really. In this snapshot, we see a few
assignments of worth on the lives of animals, really. It is an assumed obligation to life
that causes the crew to land on LV-426. Ripley chooses the lives of many over the life of
one when refusing Kane entry to the ship. Naturally, the lives of the humans, and cat, on
board are deemed more important than the life of the alien. By attempting to rescue Jones
from the Nostromo, Ripley puts her life’s worth on par with that of Jones. And of course,
humans still on Earth have deemed the alien of greater worth than the collective lives of
all others on board the ship. Because these are all parts of a highly specific story, I hope
it’s clear that I am not advocating these specific choices and assignments, especially since
this is, after all, a work o f fiction. If in a real-life application one chooses not to risk their
own life entire for a cat (or another non-human species with a degree of personhood),
that’s not a wrong choice. While I’ve tried hard to limit the scope of this discussion to

Alien and not its sequel, Aliens, it’s interesting to note that the role of Jones is replaced
with a little girl, Newt, whom Ripley saves from a situation similar to that of Jones’ however, the danger Ripley faces, the risks she takes, and the effort she puts into the
rescue of Newt is much greater than what was put into Jones’ rescue. One must wonder,
would she have done such for Jones? Nature’s supreme “virtue,” remains, again,
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almighty in the end. Self-preservation and the preservation of one’s own species are
strong instincts in the human animal. Alien does not provide some sort of over-arching
blueprint for all human interactions with non-human species. However, that does not
mean the interactions presented are unworthy of investigation, of probing - it’s a fictional
story created by very real humans, and the audiences’ experience of it is real too. The
movie does not have implications for the human/animal distinction as much as it
highlights the nuanced experience of this perceived distinction. The discussion goes well
beyond a human/alien/cat interaction.
Humans do represent an extreme in the animal kingdom. We represent a pinnacle
of creative, constructive, and destructive abilities. We are the most emotional, sometimes
both the most rational and irrational of beings on the planet. We can, with our own
brains, literally feel the pain of others. We are capable of looking into the sky and
wondering what horror and beauty may exist beyond our own planet. Over and over
again, it’s been said - the human/animal distinction is false conception of the human
animal’s standing in the natural world. This is true. It’s been said that human worth is not
inherent. I stand by this. But in the aforementioned “paradox,” these statements do not
equate to a nihilistic existence, void of anything worthy of worth. Those listed abilities,
those things that make us freaks o f the natural world, they arose out of the processes
which bore all other living things and traits. Without those abilities, this discussion would
not happen; we humans would be incapable of contemplating the origins and implications
of those abilities. Without personhood, we would not see the worth in other animals,
human or otherwise, or our individual selves. The human/animal distinction is false, but
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there are more nuanced distinctions which inform the assignment of worth - though it
was rejected in a sense, the mechanical/non-mechanical distinction among animals is an
example. There is not a distinction between humans and animals on the whole, but there
are distinctions between species - without which, there obviously wouldn’t be discretely
classified species. A lobster and a cat, a fruit fly and a moose, a tapeworm and an
echidna. Some of these species are incapable of feeling pain. Some are capable of
creating emotional bonds. Some members of these species have greater or lesser
capacities than others. As a human who is also a person, I am able to, with the help of
some collective human knowledge, distinguish among abilities, can assign worth - not
just among other animals but in regards to my own life.
Given such a small snippet of the character’s life tale, we see little individual
humanity in Ripley. The Nostromo, Mother, spacesuits and cryogenic hypersleep
chambers all attest to the ability of humans as a generalized whole, Ripley is a rather
mechanical thing in the beginning - she follows protocol, she doesn’t have any particular
affinities for the humans around her, she eats and sleeps and breathes with little joy or
terror. It is between two non-human creatures, Jones and the xenomorph, that Ripley’s
most human qualities are apparent. She must be clever enough to survive, and
simultaneously fight hysteria and terror. And in the end, she makes a very human
decision, to save Jones the cat. It is seemingly irrational and yet understandable, it is
heroic and stupid, and for the audience it makes Ripley a heroine rather than a mere
protagonist. When faced with the horror of the malicious unknown, it is Ripley’s ability
to value Jones, an animal worthy of being valued, that makes her humanity a remarkable
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thing. And though she may be another player in the Darwinian game, she is, with a little
non-human help, capable of making her survival something more than an instinctual
desire.
The artificial nature of the human/animal distinction is not a thing which
diminishes worth. We do not have to be proud jellyfish to note the amazing qualities of
the human animal. Perhaps the rejection of the human/animal distinction is a way to
extend human worth, to extend animal value, by recognizing the amazing qualities of
some fellow animals. Perhaps the rescue of a cat was the most human part of Alien.

Ripley: Final report of the commercial starship Nostromo, third officer reporting. The other
members of the crew, Kane, Lambert, Parker, Brett, Ash and Captain Dallas, are dead. Cargo and
ship destroyed. I should reach the frontier in about six weeks. With a little luck, the network will
pick me up. This is Ripley, last survivor of the Nostromo, signing off.
Come on, cat.
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